

EUROPE'S ABSORPTION OF GOLD.

A further shipment of gold to Europe, amounting to \$700,000, was made on last week, bringing the total for the fortnight up to \$2,000,000. It is announced that the ultimate destination of the metal is Russia, although it goes in the first instance to Germany, or possibly it may replace in Germany an equal amount previously sent from that country to Russia. How many millions of gold Russia has absorbed in this way during the past five years, and how much of it has been furnished by the United States, it is impossible to say exactly, but of the \$200,000,000 more than our receipts which we have sent abroad since Jan. 1, 1891, it is probable that nearly the whole has been divided between Russia and Austria. At all events, the Russian Government is credited with now having in its treasury \$400,000,000 of gold, and the Austrian with \$100,000,000, which is much more than either of them possessed in 1891, the stocks in London, Paris, and Berlin having in the same interval increased in value.

The purpose of the Russian Government in accumulating this large store of gold has all along been assumed to be of a military nature. In the event of a war with any of the other great European powers, making the negotiation of a loan difficult, the possession of these hundreds of millions in gold would be very desirable. The recent announcement, however, that Russia has been putting its gold into the shape of coin, with the view of substituting it for the irredeemable paper money of the empire now in circulation, furnishes another explanation of the matter. According to this explanation, gold to the value of \$700,000,000, or more, worth in our money \$375,000,000, or 50 cents to the rouble, has been coined in pieces of ten roubles each, and is now ready to be issued. This involves a reduction of one-third in the former metallic value of the rouble, but it represents nearly the same gold value of the paper it is intended to replace.

In the case of Austria the accumulation of gold has been made distinctly and avowedly for the purpose of resuming, on a gold basis, the specie payments which were suspended in 1848, and which, in consequence of the wars in which Austria has been involved, have never been resumed. The decrees providing for the resumption were issued in August, 1892, and, at the latest accounts, the gold coined under them had reached the amount of \$100,000,000, so that, from day to day, now, interest is expected from the Government of its resumption of specie. Like Russia, too, Austria is to resume, not in coin of its former metallic value, but in new coin representing as nearly as possible the gold value of the paper in circulation. And as Russia has definitely abandoned the old silver rouble, so Austria has abandoned the old silver standard, and for each silver florin, formerly worth 30 cents of our money, she will substitute two "crowns," worth 20 cents each in gold.

It will be interesting to observe the effect which this resumption of specie payments in gold by Russia and by Austria will have, when it takes place, upon the currencies of other civilized nations. Presumably both countries will now cease to absorb gold, at least to any great amount, and, moreover, by holding themselves ready to pay it on demand to all applicants, they may, in the vicissitudes of trade, be compelled at times to restrict the issue of their currency, or to limit the quantity of gold they are accumulating. In fact, gold payable on demand by a Government, as by a bank, is virtually the property of the whole world. Any person who can offer in exchange for it other valuable articles can get it at pleasure, and carry it away to points where it is wanted.

It is an axiom of political economy that the mass of commodities in existence at any given time, taken as a whole, tends to rise in price with the increase of the mass of money against which it is exchangeable, and to fall with its decrease. For money being itself a commodity, and different from all others only in its universal exchangeability, any increase in its supply, as compared with a fixed amount of other commodities, must lower its own exchange value, and any decrease must correspondingly raise that value. A small number of theories of this kind, which are based on its reasoning exclusively to the metallic and paper money, disregarding the immensely greater quantity of credit money, which, for purposes of trade, is the same as coin and notes. The seller of merchandise, stocks, or real estate accepts in payment, in order to obtain the cash, a bank check as willingly as he does currency, and, indeed, he usually prefers the check to the currency because of its greater safety and convenience. Among buyers competing for the same article, those who have their money on deposit in banks stand on precisely the same footing as those who have it in coin or in paper, and, in fact, the result is that fully ninety-five per cent. of the money that changes hands daily in this city and in the other business centres of the country is in the shape of bank credits, and is transferred by checks. Hence to argue that because an increase in the mass of money and paper currency of the world does not, to corresponding extent, raise prices, there is no relation between the mass of money and the prices of merchandise, is to argue on insufficient premises. Besides, where the increase of the total amount of both currency and credit is equalled, or even exceeded, by an increase in the supply of any particular article of merchandise or property, the tendency to a rise in the price of that article is counteracted.

Nevertheless, since both bank credits and paper currency are promises to pay metal, the fulfillment of which is liable, at times, to be extensively required, and since the supply of any particular article of merchandise or property, the tendency to a rise in the price of that article is counteracted. Hence the reserves which banks keep for the payment of their depositors, and which banks and governments issuing paper currency keep for the redemption of that currency when its redemption is demanded. Usually a reserve of one-fourth of the amount of the currency is held in gold, and the balance in silver, and the United States Government has at present in gold one-third of the amount of its outstanding demand notes; its gold coin and bullion being about \$127,000,000, and its notes, exclusive of those in its own possession, amounting to about \$350,000,000. The Bank of England keeps for its circulating notes, except for about \$75,000,000 secured by Government loans, a reserve of 100 per cent. in gold, and for its deposits it has at this moment one of 50 per cent. The Bank of France has for its notes and its deposits together a reserve of 45 per cent. in gold, besides 25 per cent. in silver. The Imperial Bank of Germany carries in coin and bullion nearly 100 per cent. of its outstanding notes, and 65 per cent. of its notes and deposits together. When the Austrian Government resumes specie payments, it expects to have on hand gold to the value of \$100,000,000, and the Bank of England, very few of which issue circulating notes, are content to carry against their deposits reserves of 10 per cent. and less, relying upon the Bank of England for help in time of need.

Hence, any increase in the amount of metal used as money permits an increase of the volume of credits, and thus tends to raise the general level of the prices of commodities. Upon this fact is founded much of the reasoning of the European bimetallicists in favor of according to silver the privilege of unlimited coinage. They say that if silver is to go to gold and using it concurrently with gold as the foundation of credit money, or, as our silverites phrase it, making it equally with gold "a means of ultimate redemption," would immensely increase the volume of money available for purchase and thus raise the price of all commodities, in error in assuming that both metals can be thus fused together so as to form a homogeneous unit. Their exchange value as money is fixed by their exchange value as metal, and, as this value varies, in each, with the quantity of it in market, one is at one time more valuable as money than the other, and which ever is the more valuable will, under the free coinage of both, be discarded from use as money. This has happened again and again in France, which is so triumphantly pointed to as an example of what bimetallicism can accomplish, and has of late years been the case in the United States. Francis A. Walker, in his latest pamphlet on the subject says: "We flatly deny that bimetallicism necessarily involves the concurrent circulation of the two metals," and, "If it re-

sults only in establishing an alternating circulation the chief results of bimetallicism will be achieved as they were by the action of France." On the other hand, gold monometallists are somewhat embarrassed to explain why, with the enormous increase in the production of gold during the past few years in Africa and in the United States, raising the world's annual product from \$130,000,000 in 1891 to \$200,000,000 in 1895, and the total product for the five years to \$815,000,000, the prices of staple commodities have failed to advance in any marked degree. The anomaly is partially accounted for by the increased consumption of gold for decorative and manufacturing purposes, which in the United States alone has been in some recent years as much as \$15,000,000, and has rarely fallen below \$10,000,000. For the whole world the most moderate experts estimate it at \$60,000,000 per year and some put it at a higher figure. Still, at \$60,000,000 per year it would amount for five years past to but \$300,000,000, leaving \$515,000,000 to be added to the world's stock. Considering that a great total product of \$815,000,000 in five years from 1893 to 1897, when the California and Australia mines were most fruitful, led to a marked rise in prices, this not addition of \$515,000,000 in the last five years ought to have been effective in the same manner, and probably it would have been thus effective but for the interference of Russia and Austria. That interference having now come to an end, the continued increase in the yield of gold should legitimately lead to a fall in its purchasing power, just as stopping the absorption of silver by our Government in 1893 led to a fall in the price of silver, and to a rise in the price of the other commodities. The fact that the Sherman act, in fact, that was the closing of the India mints in 1893 which caused the decline, but this is untrue. As soon as our Government, in 1893, ceased to obstruct the natural course of trade, silver, under the influence of the nearly constant supply of new metal, rose in value, and now that Russia and Austria have ceased to interfere with the natural distribution of gold, its purchasing power ought also to diminish, or, what is the same thing, the gold prices of commodities ought to rise. Silver has already risen, and, unless some fresh disturbing cause, such as the stopping of the South African gold mines, comes in to prevent it, other commodities will rise also.

MATTHEW MARSHALL.

FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

New York Stock Exchange - Sales and Range of Prices on All Securities Dealt in During the Week Ending April 18, 1908.

RAILROAD AND OTHER BONDS (in \$1,000s).					
Series.	Name.	Open- ing.	High.	Low.	Close.
1018	Atchafalaya 4s.	77 1/2	80	77 1/2	79 1/2
1019	Atchafalaya AdJ 4s.	84 1/2	86 1/2	84 1/2	85 1/2
809	Atchafalaya 3d A. T. 10.	80	80 1/2	80 1/2	81 1/2
1020	American C. & N. H. 4s.	110 1/2	111 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2
99	American C. & N. H. 3d A. T. 10.	85 1/2	86 1/2	85 1/2	86 1/2
99	Austin & N. W. 1st.	108 1/2	109 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2
99	Austin & N. W. 2d.	108 1/2	109 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2
1	Albany & Schenectady 4s.	110 1/2	111 1/2	110 1/2	110 1/2
1	Albany & Schenectady 3d A. T. 10.	85 1/2	86 1/2	85 1/2	86 1/2
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